06/11/2023
From the Archives
Gaza (III) Palestine October-November 1917
In 1917, the Sherwood Rangers and South Notts Hussars were serving in 7 Mounted Brigade, part of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, under General Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby KCB who had been brought up in Nottinghamshire, and knew the Sherwood Rangers very well.
The sea to the west of Gaza and the high ground to the east of Beersheba create, to all intents and purposes, closed flanks. Any attack on the Turks would have to take place either on one of those two strongly-held towns, or the thirty miles between them. The dominant feature between the towns was an area of slightly higher ground on which sat the small settlement of Tel esh Sheria (Sheria). Two frontal attacks on the well-defended Gaza having failed before he took over, Allenby decided that XXI Corps (three divisions) would face Gaza and XX Corps (four divisions) would face Beersheba, both from the south. The battle would have the following phases:
1. XXI Corps to make a concerted attack on Gaza, supported from the sea, as a deception.
2. Desert Mounted Corps (DMC) would take Beersheba from the east following a concealed approach out of the desert; 7 Mounted Brigade’s role, operating independently, was to fill and cover the gap between the DMC’s left flank and XX Corps’ right flank.
3. XX Corps would consolidate in Beersheba.
4. XX Corps, supported by the DMC, would strike north up the Beersheba-Hebron- Jerusalem road to secure a start line to the west of the road, facing west towards Sheria.
5. XX Corps would then attack Sheria from the east, rolling up the Turks’ positions in between, forcing a fatal hole in the Turkish line.
6. On XX Corps taking the Sheria position, the DMC would be passed through to exploit north-west, bypassing Gaza, cutting off the enemy’s retreat from his main position in that town, and thus defeating him.
7. Pursuit and destruction.
The DMC was commanded by General Sir Henry George Chauvel GCMG KCB, the first Australian to command a corps. The son of a grazier, Chauvel was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Upper Clarence Light Horse, a unit organized by his father, became a regular officer in 1896 and, in 1899, commanded a company of Queensland Mounted Infantry in the Boer War. In May 1915 his formation deployed to Egypt and was sent, dismounted, to Gallipoli, where he, as its commander, assumed responsibility for some of the most dangerous parts of the line. He was subsequently promoted to command the DMC.
The ANZAC divisions did not carry sabres but the yeomanry did. All carried rifles, and the average weight carried by the horses was estimated at twenty stones, when fodder for the horse, ammunition, saddlery, weapons and the personal kit of the men were taken into account. Such an extreme weight placed a limit on the average distance covered on a daily basis.
Allenby’s deception attack on Gaza by XXI Corps started on 27 October with bombardment, and then built up and continued throughout the subsequent action. He attacked in the east on 31 October following a formidable approach march by the DMC, forming a right-flanking sweep deep into the desert to avoid detection. During 31 October both XX Corps and DMC fought actions to position DMC for the final assault. When that came, it took the form of the famous and phase-winning charge of the Australian Mounted Division (AMD), followed up by other elements of the DMC and XX Corps, so that by 1800 hours they were both firm in Beersheba. Vitally they had secured the wells before the Turks could destroy them. In the absence of sabres, the heroic AMD attacked using their bayonets as hand weapons.
Later engagements by yeomanry using sabres proved more effective than bayonets; indeed on subsequent occasions, the AMD felt, by comparison, unable to engage mounted because of the lack of a suitable weapon. This failure to arm mounted formations with sabres was a consequence of the strategic failure to realize that cavalry, correctly handled to exploit firstly surprise, then manoeuvre too fast for the machine guns to track or lay, and finally fear of the sabre or lance, alone, still had the beating of the machine guns. These elements combined to achieve what was called ‘Shock Action’ and could be overwhelming. As will be seen, the ANZACs were eventually issued with sabres.
Seven Mounted Brigade had a satisfactory day as Major Hugh Tallents describes in his book 'Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry in the Great War': ‘Our orders were to occupy before dawn [on the 31st] a position in front of Ras Ghannam and Ras Hablein and to pursue the enemy if he retired ... at 1600 a general attack was ordered.’
Their supporting 20 Machine Gun Squadron, positioned behind them, observed that:The Brigade at once formed up in a cloud of dust, and led by its General as if on a ceremonial parade at home, started off at the trot to attack. Soon the dust became so dense (especially in the centre of the Brigade), that it was impossible to see two yards in front.
With C Squadron leading, the regiment galloped in open order over rocky and mountainous ground to take the trenches on Ras Ghannam. The enemy fled and were captured by the Australians. The brigade followed the Australians into Beersheba at 1830 without opposition and, as Tallents notes: watered at about 2300 after thirty hours without water ... . Probably 40,000 animals had to be watered at this one place for several days, each may have taken several gallons at a time.
Allenby wanted to give the Turks time to respond to XXI Corps’ deception attack on Gaza by reinforcing it with troops who had been covering their left, making the attack on Sheria easier. Unfortunately, the opposite occurred because the Turks thought that their main threat now was from an attack, which was in fact unrealistic, north up the Beersheba-Hebron road, the direct route to Jerusalem, which lay100 miles to the north, and which they knew to be open. As a result, they started to move troops from Sheria, as Allenby had hoped. Instead of moving west to Gaza, they deployed east towards the ground Allenby planned to use as his start line for his attack on Sheria. This was bad news, particularly, as it turned out, for the Sherwood Rangers.
On 1 November XX Corps, as planned, advanced north, with DMC on their right, towards their intended start line. The ground was bare and rocky and fairly flat till it rose into the Judean Hills, where it was necessary for the start line to be established. By the end of the day, significant progress had been made, but shortage of water was becoming critical due to the wells at Beersheba becoming overwhelmed.
In the 'Official History of the Great War – Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from June 1917 to the end of the War' by Captain Cyril Falls notes: Water [now an additional need to that of securing Allenby’s start line] could be found only by further advance [to reach the next nearest wells which lay in the same area as the start line but held by the Turks] and 7 Mounted Brigade with a regiment of 3 Australian Light Horse Brigade (3rd ALH) attached was ordered to move out on the morrow under the command of A&NZ Mounted Division and occupy the area Tel Khuweilfe, Bir Khuweilfe, Bir Abu Khuff and Ain Kohle. Then goes on to note that, on 2 November: The Brigade had marched up the Khuweilfe track which leaves Hebron road near Kh. El Jubbein ... . It reached the fork in the track ... without difficulty ... . On the right the South Notts Hussars was ordered to seize the dominating height known as Ras en Naqb ... the Sherwood Rangers were to work up the left track and occupy the high ground at Bir Abu Khuff ... . By 0300, after driving back the small bodies of enemy, it [SNH] occupied Ras en Naqb, capturing 11 prisoners and two guns ... . On the other flank, however, the Sherwood Rangers was held up astride the Wadi Kohle, considerably short of its objective.
Tallents takes up the account: B Squadron were now North of the Ain Kohle road, so C Squadron were sent to the south of it but both were quickly held up and a large body of the enemy appeared on their left flank [This was the advanced guard of the enemy re-deployment from Sheria to cover the Beersheba-Jerusalem road].
The other three troops of A Squadron were sent at full gallop to support C Squadron, whose left flank was in great danger, and the ground on this side of the road was then cleared after some fighting, during which Lt J. R. Abdy, with a few men, gallantly cleared out some Turks who were concealed amongst the rocks on the crest of one of the many steep hills. Lt Abdy was wounded in the shoulder and Lt Birchall received a slight wound to the neck, but was able to rejoin after having it dressed.
The flank guard troop of A Squadron, under Lt York, now rejoined, and a company of the Camel Corps extended our left, which relieved the situation to some extent. The Regiment then attempted to take [the] Hill [known as] Khuweilfe, which was a very high and dominating position upon the slopes of which the enemy was established in some strength with several machine guns.
The Essex Battery RHA shelled the hill while A and C Squadrons worked forward as far as possible under cover. They were, however, still a long way from the top of the hill and separated from it by a stretch of flat ground; it was thought that this could be crossed mounted with fewer casualties than on foot, and there appeared to be some steep cliffs which would afford shelter for the horses a little way up the hill on the far side of the flat ground. Lt Moss with two troops of C Squadron, and Lts Birchall and York with two troops of A Squadron galloped forward and reached the selected places for the horses, but there were several casualties owing to the heavy and increasing rifle and machine-gun fire and from horses falling on the rocks.
All four troops dismounted but found it impossible to advance far beyond this point, owing to the heavy fire from the top and higher slopes; neither could they retire in daylight without heavy loss as the volume of fire which swept the open ground was now very heavy, so they held their position all day.
B Squadron on the right and the remainder of A and C Squadrons on the left and a section of 20 Machine Gun Squadron, held positions to the flanks and rear of the advanced troops. Strong enemy reinforcements could be seen as they reached the position and we were already heavily outnumbered apart from the strength of their position; they were continually trying to get round our left flank, and late in the afternoon the prospect for us looked very black. 5th ALH came up on the right of B Squadron in the evening but were held up by much superior forces. It was evident that the position could not be taken that day or at all without a very much larger force.
The regiment pulled back in the night, not without difficulty, and formed an outpost line, leaving the water holes, which they had been sent to secure, firmly in enemy hands. Relieved the next day (2 November) by another brigade, regimental casualties were one killed, and two officers and sixteen ORs wounded; they withdrew to Beersheba, the horses not having watered for forty hours. Lieutenant Colonel Thorpe believed that if the regiment had been two hours earlier, it would have been they, not the Turks, who would have secured Khuweilfe.
The Official History estimates that by nightfall on 2 November there were more than 4,000 enemy rifles and sabres (compared with the brigade’s fewer than 1,000) on Khuweilfe, the vital ground opposite the brigade’s position. The Official History goes on to credit the SNH’s capture of Ras en Naqb as having cut the lines of communication of the Turkish Seventh Army Headquarters in Hebron with their left flank, and induced a state of near panic there, which caused them to make these re-dispositions in such numbers. Whilst they would have to be removed or neutralized before any attack on Sheria, they had at least been moved from Sheria, creating a valuable weakness there. This task of removing them was assigned to 53rd Division, who fought hard between 3 and 5 November to secure a satisfactory start line for XX Corps, albeit one which suffered some threat from the position at Khuweilfe.
The Official History sums up the fighting between 1 and 5 November: [It] resulted tactically in a drawn battle, satisfactory to neither side ... . Yet strategically the British were to have no cause to complain of the result. They had placed themselves in a position of vantage from which to roll up the enemy’s flank. … . They had drawn in his [the Turkish] reserve ... division, which would otherwise have gone to Sheria. All the ground lent itself admirably to defence, as is proved by the fact that in the whole course of the fighting neither side can be said to have made a single successful attack, with the exception of the capture of Ras en Naqb.
The attack by XX Corps and DMC on Sheria from the east, rolling up the enemy's defensive positions on the way, commenced at first light on 6 November and was concluded by last light. With the capture of Sheria and the defeat of their forces in that area, the Turks commenced a full retreat from Gaza. The pursuit commenced at first light on 7 November and continued until the 10th. The pursuit was frustratingly disappointing, partly because there was delay getting the mounted formations through the breach in the line, but mainly because of the enormous difficulty and slowness in watering horses at infrequent watering places, which prevented any pressure being brought to bear on the enemy. Some baggage trains were captured, but most of the two Turkish armies escaped, albeit badly mauled.
The astonishing length of time that regiments of horses, these remarkable creatures so important to the development of civilization and warfare, were found to be able to go without watering whilst in full work was one of the revelations of the campaign; sixty hours on several occasions and, once, eighty-four hours by the Lincolnshire Yeomanry. One explanation for this may be the discovery during this campaign that horses with thoroughbred bloodlines that, therefore, reach back to the Arab horses from Middle East, performed best. The Arab was bred by the Bedouin for beauty, speed and stamina and, logically, would have also been bred for its ability to reach scarce waterholes. However it should be added that, well-bred or not, they scattered all who dared to stand in their way once the scent of water was at last in their nostrils.
For their participation in the battle, the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry and the South Notts Hussars were awarded the Battle Honour 'Gaza'
Many thanks to Colonel Jonathan Hunt for his permission to use this extract from his book 'Hard Fighting A History of the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry 1900 - 1946'
The book is published by Pen and Sword Books, and is available for sale at the RLNY Museum
