03/21/2016
The first photo is of item UNI 10425, part of the Imperial War Museum's collection, accessed through their splendid website catalogue. Links to this item and a related one will follow at the end of this post. Uniform item 10425 is a camouflaged sniper's overgarment, this particular example being a single-breasted robe made of canvas with a fitted hood and facemask. It is very much typical of these items, save for the three-dimensional camouflage in the form of applied foliage.
As with all other aspects of the First World War, the sniper's war was a continuous learning process, the marksman's role ever-evolving. It is discussed very readably by Maj. H. Hesketh-Prichard, DSO, MC in his work "Sniping in France." The second photo is from this work, demonstrating the efficacy of the camouflage robe in an open field in broad daylight: some of the most unfavourable conditions imaginable. In the North American cultural context, sniping and reconnaissance is rightly held up to be very important work but is broadly misunderstood: while vital, for decisions are only as good as the information on which they are made, the role of information gathering is held entirely secondary to the role of stalking and shooting the enemy. Films and books are replete with stories involving the heroic lone actor effecting the war effort directly with a single shot, acting independently of friendly forces and with little if any communication with them. This is largely due to the legacy of the settler-frontiersman and trapper-hunter in the 'frontier nation' mythos held by both Canada and the United States. Hesketh-Prichard's work holds up the importance of intelligence gathering and its role within the all-important combined arms team. A link to an online copy is provided below. Some excerpts follow:
"But taken long by broad the accuracy of the information given by snipers was really wonderful. On one occasion the snipers of the 33rd Division reported that two Germans had been seen with the number 79 upon their helmets. This information went from Battalion, through Brigade, Division and Corps, to Army, who rather pooh-poohed the snipers' accuracy, as the 79th, when last heard of, had been upon the Russian front. Within a day or two, however, the Germans opposite the battalion to which these snipers belonged sent a patrol out of their trenches one misty morning. The patrol fell in with our scouts, who killed two and carried back the regulation identifications. These proved the sentries to be correct."
"But the duty of the sniper changed as the war went on. At first his job was to dominate the German snipers, destroy their moral, and make life secure for his own comrades. At the same time there was his Intelligence work. Later, as the warfare became more open, he proved his value over and over again in attack.
When a trench was taken, it was his duty to get out in front and (lying in a shell-hole) to keep the enemy heads down while his companions consolidated the newly-won position."
In connection with the Newfoundland Regiment's experience, the snipers and scouts of the Regiment were deployed at Monchy-le-Preux in early 1917 for exactly the role defined above by Maj. Hesketh-Prichard. The effect of a sniper screen in the hasty defence was to kill enemy scouts, preventing him from gaining an accurate picture of the consolidating unit and any follow-on forces and to disrupt any counterattack made. As part of daily trench life, the capacity of scouts and snipers for observation was of vital importance, with the smallest details often making big returns. Those already familiar with anecdotes from the sniping war will find full accounts in "Sniping in France," including the story of 'the headquarters' cat.'
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/30092440
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/30097861
http://www.allworldwars.com/Sniping%20in%20France%20by%20Major%20Hesketh-Prichard.html
