http://history.nd.gov/historicsites/minutemanmissile/index.html

Ronald Reagan Minuteman Missile State Historic Site, Cooperstown, ND (2026)

06/01/2026

Silo-ology: Counterforce vs. Counterforce

Sitting in a launch tube 90 ft deep and only 15 ft. in diameter, and beneath a 107.5 ton enclosure door, a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile was likely found at the former November-33 Launch Facility between 1972-73 until August 1997. We say "likely" due to possible modification or maintenance programs during that time.

Possessing a range of greater than 6,000 miles, Minuteman IIIs assigned to Grand Forks Air Force Base after the 1980 timeframe carried up to three W78 thermonuclear warheads rated between 335 to 350 kilotons - roughly 25 times the power of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. The multiple warheads were independently targetable upon an area "footprint" about 600 miles wide by 900 miles long. They were (and continue to be) accurate, and could be used in a counterforce role against Soviet missile silos considering their 600 ft circular error probable (CEP) on a specified target.

As Minuteman IIIs in North Dakota were upgraded beginning in 1980, the Soviet Union was deploying the R-36M, or the SS-18 "Satan" missile. The SS-18 Mod 4 variant in particular began to directly threaten American Minuteman missile silos as each carried between 8-10 500 to 550 kiloton warheads with an accuracy of .92 kilometers - or about a half mile. Deployed later, a rough American counterpart to the SS-18 Mod 4 was the highly accurate Peacekeeper ICBM that could carry 10 warheads, each rated to 300-475 kilotons, with a CEP rated as tight as 130 ft.

Considering that hardened yet static missile silos became increasingly vulnerable to strikes in the 1980s, the superpowers considered other options. Both the United States and the Soviet Union studied rail-mobile and road-mobile ICBMs with only the Soviets actually deploying either type (the rail-mobile SS-24 "Scalpel" and road-mobile SS-25 "Sickle").

Near the end of the Cold War, the United States considered a rail-mobile Peacekeeper Rail Garrison program and a road-mobile Small ICBM (SICBM) nicknamed "Midgetman". Both programs were cancelled in the early 1990s, and in the post-Cold War environment, the United States instead retained the static yet accurate Minuteman III along with the mobile capability of the U.S. Navy's Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines carrying Trident I and highly-accurate Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Trident Is were later all replaced with Trident IIs).

Today, one can view a former Minuteman III Launch Facility at North Dakota's former November-33 just east of Cooperstown, North Dakota.

06/01/2026

A Happy Birthday today to Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander 1st Lt. Grouch - formerly of the 448th Strategic Missile Squadron, 321st Strategic Missile Wing, Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota.

First appearing on Sesame Street on November 10, 1969, Oscar is major fan of trash and can most often be found in his metal can. While our underground Launch Control Center is pretty clean, he'd certainly feel right at home in our metal capsule.

An Air Force-era mural of Oscar the Grouch can be seen on tour in our underground Launch Control Center, alongside Missile Combat Crew Commander Captain "Arnie" Eagle.

05/31/2026

That's 640 or 1240 on your AM dial...

A long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away...and in an age before the smart phone - there was only AM radio.

Established in 1951, the CONtrol of ELectromagnetic RADiation was used as a method for broadcasting emergency messages to the public in the event of enemy attack. This was at a time when 95% of American homes had access to AM radio broadcasts as compared with 23% of homes having television at that time (and maybe 60% had land-line telephone access).

0% had 5G internet (or any internet for that matter).

The thought was enemy bombers could use the signals from American radio stations as navigational beacons during an attack. CONELRAD was instituted to defeat this practice, requiring all FM radio and television stations to switch off during a nuclear attack. Only designated emergency AM stations would broadcast messages on the 640AM or 1240AM frequency, and then not constantly, but going on and off the air. Between 1953 and 1963, by law, most American radios produced featured small triangles on radio dials to designate the two CONELRAD frequencies.

Including passing along attack warnings from the National Warning Center located in Colorado Springs, Colorado (and later from within Cheyenne Mountain), CONELRAD would broadcast fallout warnings after the attack along with other instructions to their broadcast area.

The practice was obsolete by the late 1950s with the advent of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (which didn't home in on radio frequencies). CONELRAD was replaced by the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) in 1963 - of which tests could occasionally be observed and heard on both television and radio throughout the remainder of the Cold War. EBS was activated over 20,000 times between 1963 and 1996 according to a 1996 Los Angeles Times article - but for tornadoes, blizzards, and other catastrophes. While today's Emergency Alert System uses a pattern of electronic buzzing-like pulses as an audio alert, many who grew up with EBS before 1997 will remember the shrill, high-pitched tone that announced a test.

Today, the Emergency Alert System continues to be used for a range of civil emergencies such as tornadoes or wildfires. In a modern age with much heavier reliance on mobile phones, Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) provides warning in households with cellular phones but without radio and television. WEA has a "National Alert" capability that can override any blocks made to other alerts on cellular phones. These can only be initiated by the President of the United States or the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

05/30/2026

Nuclear survival at Oscar-Zero

We're finishing up this week's theme of protracted nuclear warfighting with expectations of survival at the Oscar-Zero Launch Control Facility/Missile Alert Facility and at the November-33 Launch Facility.

A protracted nuclear war is concept where instead of single massive blows against either superpower that might take place over hours, a limited nuclear conflict against specified targets might take place (such as a counterforce attack against enemy missile silos or bomber bases) over days or even weeks. The war might be one of tactical nuclear weapons being employed in Europe or Asia or on a strategic level between the Cold War superpowers.

With guidance from the Kennedy Administration - particularly from the 1961 Fletcher Committee report about Minuteman missile shortfalls and vulnerabilities along with WSEG Report Number 50 (in which Minuteman and Polaris emerge as favored strategic nuclear deterrents) - Wing VI of the Minuteman program was planned from the outset to include more survivable and redundant features.

Interestingly (when compared with the already planned Titan-I and Atlas-F silos), Wing I (Malmstrom AFB, Montana - except the 564th SMS) and Wing II (Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota) have their diesel power generator, cooling system, and other environmental systems configured in a "soft" arrangement within the topside Launch Control Support Building (LCSB). As Kennedy entered office, officials within his administration recommended the Air Force reconfigure the soon-underway Ellsworth sites to be better protected (it was too late for Malmstrom sites already being built) - however costs for modification made this unworkable. This means Wing I and Wing II sites look mostly similar. An example of this system can be seen on public tour at the Minuteman Missile National Historic Site in South Dakota.

Wing III at Minot (along with Wing IV at Whiteman in Missouri and Wing V at F.E. Warren in Wyoming) featured a modification to place these systems underground in a relatively-hard 300 pound per square inch overpressure protected structure across from the Launch Control Center. Further, "emergency generator hardness" at Launch Facilities was enhanced to 25 psi protection. An example of this LCC/LCEB configuration can be seen on public tour at the former Quebec 01 Missile Alert Facility in Wyoming and through special arrangement at the former Oscar-1 facility located on Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri (entry restricted to those who can attain base access).

It would be Wing VI at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, along with the 564th Strategic Missile Squadron at Malmstrom AFB, that would feature dedicated redundancies and protections recommended by the Fletcher Committee. "Improved" Minuteman featured underground Launch Control Equipment Buildings designed to a 1,000 psi protection standard whereas generator protection at the Launch Facilities were upped to 300 psi. "Deuce" sites were the final construction evolution of the Minuteman program, although modification programs were already on the drawing board. The last intact "Deuce" configuration site can be seen on public tour at the Ronald Reagan Minuteman Missile State Historic Site in North Dakota.

Enhanced protection of launch sites meant that crews could theoretically continue monitoring and launching Minuteman missiles several weeks into a nuclear conflict. Nalty's USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1964-1966 rated "Deuce" sites as having as much as 9 weeks of survivability. Other redundancies and targeting capabilities made "Deuce" sites examples of Kennedy's Flexible Response doctrine.

Beyond this, and beyond the scope of our focus here in North Dakota, improvements in submarine-launched ballistic missile technology further enhanced America's protracted war fighting capability. Ballistic missile submarines act in stealth and carry longer lifespans at sea - operating for months at a time with endurance only limited by food supplies.

An "advertised" notion that a nation had a protracted nuclear warfighting capability meant that an adversary would see that a surprise nuclear attack on the United States was not viable. The Americans would merely ride-out the attack and make a coordinated retaliatory attack to destroy the aggressor's ability to fight and quite possibly end their ability to function as a society. As the Soviet Union began hardening their own missile silos and began deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the mid-1960s, any incentive for the Americans to preemptively strike the Soviet Union became an unworkable notion as well. This gave rise to the mutually assured destruction, or MAD, concept, that came to dominate the later half of the Cold War.

Of course, there was no way to truly "stress-test" such a warfighting system outside of a nuclear war - only command-post exercises like IVY LEAGUE '82 could simulate them. Could the United States fight and prevail (at least on favorable terms during war termination) during a limited nuclear war during the later Cold War period? Would things quickly escalate to a massive strategic exchange? Would command and control systems continue operating after the first salvo? On either side?

Luckily, for the world, we never found out.

(Below: An artist's depiction of "Deuce" site operations via cable/radio systems)

05/29/2026

IVY LEAGUE '82 and its aftermath.

in 1982, the Pentagon releases the first defense guidance document of the Reagan Administration. Set to form the basis of the next five years in defense planning and budget, "Fiscal Year 1984-1988 Defense Guidance" discussed the premise of fighting a protracted nuclear war with the Soviet Union - meaning instead of a single massive exchange, nuclear weapons might be used numerous times over several days, weeks, or even months. Consideration was also made for "decapitation" attacks against Soviet leadership and command and control during a nuclear conflict - a continuation of Carter's PD-59 as mentioned in a previous post this week on our page.

The 125-page paper also provided guidance on large-scale conventional war, the use of special operations forces, military operations in space, as well as the continued development of the Rapid Deployment Force - units quickly deployable to protect American interests in the Middle East (including North Dakota's two B-52 wings at the time, the 5th at Minot and the 319th at Grand Forks).

Enhancements to the highly-accurate Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile were recommended, along with improvements to the strategic command and control system of the United States. The ultimate goal was for the United States to "...prevail (in a war) and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States." In a world where thousands of strategic nuclear weapons stood on alert on either side, this would be a daunting task.

Weeks earlier that February, President Reagan received his first briefing on the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) - often described as "America's nuclear war plan" - before the IVY LEAGUE '82 military exercise. This extensively planned exercise would simulate a nuclear attack upon the United States and would take place later that month into March. IVY LEAGUE included a number of "players", often former governmental officials, that would play the role of U.S. leadership. For instance, the role of the U.S. President was played by former Secretary of State William Rogers.

Reagan himself was allowed to observe and ask questions (the first to participate in such an exercise since Eisenhower) but was not allowed to personally intervene so as to not show his true inclination during a real-life crisis and/or war. As a simulated theater war escalated to all-out nuclear war, it was described that without enhanced civil defense measures, a Soviet attack would kill at least 80 million Americans utilizing 5,000 megatons of explosive power. The scenario included a preemptive attack on Washington D.C., setting up for another exercise to take place - NINE LIVES - that considered presidential succession, along with REX '82 which considered continuity of government along with other emergency wartime contingencies.

According to a January 19th, 1984 New York Times article - ''...After President Reagan watched someone face up to the decision to push the nuclear button,'' said an official, ''all of a sudden, there was a sensitivity that wasn't there before.'' It was noted that Reagan observed a map of the United States "turn into a sea of red" - indicating simulated nuclear detonations.

The following few years would see an uptick in tensions perhaps only symbolically eased when Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva during November 1985. Ensuing years would see more meetings between East and West - notably the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 - that would ultimately result in arms agreements towards and beyond the end of the Cold War.

(Notes: Reagan's Nuclear War Briefing Declassified - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/.../reagans-nuclear-war.... Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy For Fighting A Long Nuclear War - Richard Halloran, New York Times, May 30, 1982, Reagan as Military Commander - Richard Halloran, New York Times, January 15, 1984, Raven Rock by Garrett Graff)

05/29/2026

Key turn on my mark...the stakes of a Cold War.

"1-7.6.2.3 Cooperative Missile Launch. Cooperative missile launch is provided at the launch control panel. The key-operated switch is rotated simultaneously with the corresponding switch on the command console to allow transmission of an Execute Launch Command"

The Minuteman missile system required both the Missile Combat Crew Commander and Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander to turn launch keys at the same time. In the case of the "Deuce" system of Minuteman sites at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota and with the 564th Missile Squadron at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, the Execute Launch Command could be transmitted either via Hardened Intersite Cable System (HICS) or via medium-frequency radio to the Launch Facilities (missile silos) located between 3 and 18 miles distant.

A single Launch Control Center required another Launch Control Center in the missile squadron to key turn as well to constitute another launch vote. With this accomplished, missileers would continue through their checklists to note launch indications via the "Missile Away" lights on the Status Console. It's been said that the underground crew might also call up to the Flight Security Controller sitting at their desk topside in the Security Control Center to note launch indications (and potentially any enemy nuclear bursts in the distance) as well - for as long as they could. Launch reports were then sent on to Squadron Command Posts. The Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS) aboard specially-equipped EC-135 aircraft within a certain line-of-sight distance could also help launch Minuteman (and later Peacekeeper) missiles.

With rare exceptions (such as during a Simulated Electronic Launch Minuteman, SELM), crews would never turn launch keys at operational Minuteman sites except after a validated Emergency Action Message instructed them to launch. One might note the tag "Gently" above launch switches in film or documentaries - a clear indication that it was taking place at a training simulator back on base in which crews were trained to carry out a multitude of scenarios. Of course, keys were regularly inserted at these training panels - with stickers reminding missileers not to be too rough with the keys.

In essence, turning launch keys and subsequently sending nuclear-armed Minuteman missiles to distant targets, presumably many of them being in the Soviet Union and presumably with Soviet missiles raining down on American targets (depending on the scenario), represented a cataclysmic failure of nuclear deterrence. While weapons and crews were maintained on ready alert, the deterrence concept meant that the missiles were never intended to be used for their designed task. Hundreds of millions, even billions, of lives worldwide were at stake. Cities, nations, and societies built up so painfully over hundreds and thousands of years could be quickly extinguished by blast, fire, electromagnetic pulse, radiation, and slowly by secondary effects such as famine, disease, and environmental damage. The stakes of the Cold War going hot are horrible to contemplate.

It could be said that the Minuteman missile sites of Grand Forks completed their intended deterrence mission as they were never launched and were removed from service in North Dakota between 1995 and 1998.

In 2026, nine nations retain nuclear arsenals - including the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and presumably Israel. A number of nuclear weapons continue to be maintained on nuclear alert - including the Minuteman III in the United States.

05/27/2026

93F predicted for tomorrow (that’s almost 34C)

It probably won’t snow.

05/27/2026

Trans- and Post-Nuclear Environments

Into the 1980s, a renewed emphasis on a robust nuclear command, control, and communications (C3) capability emerged in American war planning. Presidential Directive 59 or PD-59 under the Carter Administration sought a nuclear force with "a high degree of flexibility, enduring survivability, and adequate performance in the face of enemy actions." Further developments continued into the Reagan years.

During a nuclear attack, America's worldwide C3 systems needed to continue operating under extreme pressure in order for messages to go out to the nuclear forces. Telephone lines were not expected to survive an assault, radio systems could be strained by atmospheric nuclear bursts, and satellite relays might be knocked out of orbit by Soviet anti-satellite capabilities. This meant that even more redundancies were introduced in an attempt to communicate and control forces during and after an attack.

New communication capabilities were considered in the form of a robust, jam-resistant, higher-orbit satellite system - to become the MILSTAR (Military Strategic and Tactical Relay) system. The Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN) series of low-frequency relay towers were planned across the United States in order to communicate to SAC bases and missile sites while under attack. Lastly (although many other projects comprised updates in the 1980s), a large Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) antenna system was planned in Wisconsin and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan in order to better communicate with ballistic missile submarines.

Within the Strategic Air Command meanwhile, concepts of alternate command post capabilities utilizing redundant methods of communications had been in place for some time - but these saw some updates in the 1980s. While the "Looking Glass" EC-135 aircraft, the "Doomsday Plane/National Emergency Airborne Command Post" E-4 and other EC-135s with PACCS missions had become visible symbols of the Post-Attack Command and Control System (PACCS) - SAC also deployed a Headquarters Emergency Relocation Team (HERT) in the 1980s that relied on tractor-trailers and relocated personnel to potentially continue a war. Nebraska's former Cornhusker Army Ammunition Plant just west of the City of Grand Island was a known HERT site.

Further, bases planned for teams to disperse to Alternate Reconstitution Bases (ARBs) in order to receive bomber and tanker aircraft completing first-sortie strikes whose bases may have been destroyed. The goal was to repair, refuel, and re-arm aircraft for follow-up strikes.

The missile field had Alternate Command Posts as well. In the case of the 321st Strategic Missile Wing, the ACP was at the Mike-Zero Launch Control Facility/Missile Alert Facility located not far from Hope, North Dakota. It was outfitted with additional communication capabilities and crews were trained specifically for ACP operations in case the main command post at Grand Forks Air Force Base had been destroyed.

Below, a missile combat crew can be seen at the command console conversing. This photo was taken at Mike-Zero during the late 1960s - note the red telephone on the right of the photo mounted on the status console - something not seen at "primary" Launch Control Centers like Oscar-Zero.

05/26/2026

The ABM Treaty

May 26th, 1972. The United States and the Soviet Union sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in Moscow.

A part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or SALT, the ABM Treaty was intended to slow the Cold War arms race by restricting the deployment of ABM systems. While the Soviet Union had deployed a modest system to defend the Moscow area, the United States was in the process of building two state-of-the-art Safeguard installations in North Dakota and Montana for the defense of Minuteman fields.

The ABM Treaty allowed for only two installations per country, one to defend a national capital, the other to defend a single missile field. As construction in North Dakota was much further along, Montana site construction was abandoned.

For a brief period in late 1975 into early 1976, North Dakota's Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex operated as the only nuclear anti-ballistic missile installation in the United States.
October 1st, 2025 marked 50th anniversary of SRMSC becoming fully operational. October 2nd, 2025 meanwhile marked 50th anniversary of the Appropriations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives voting to shut down the installation due to concerns about system ineffectiveness (A myth exists that the site was operational for only a single day while in reality the actual lifespan of the installation was from April 1st, 1975 to February 10th, 1976).

In June of 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM treaty leading to its termination.

05/26/2026

Bringing the Battle Back to the Battlefield: Project Vista

May 25th, 1953 - Shot Grable of Operation Upshot-Knothole took place at the Nevada Test Site north of Las Vegas, Nevada. A 15 kiloton burst (about the same yield as the Hiroshima bomb) detonating at 524 feet, Grable was a test of the "Atomic Annie" cannon firing a 280mm nuclear artillery shell. It was one of America's first tactical nuclear weapons.

Project Vista, a top secret study conducted in 1951, considered the use of smaller "tactical" nuclear weapons to counter ground armies with superior manpower (such as against the Soviets in Central Europe). A worry was that "strategic" weapons, such as those bombs held and being developed by Strategic Air Command, would not quickly counter Soviet advances on the battlefield as their employment would be against targets deeper within the Soviet Union - such as industrial centers or strategic military targets. Tactical nuclear weapons were soon introduced to Western Europe and South Korea in the form of artillery shells, tactical missiles, bombs, and even atomic demolition munitions. The Soviets would develop tactical weapons of their own.

Back at the Nevada Test Site in May 1953, William Stevens, later to serve as head of the nuclear safety department at Sandia National Laboratories, remembered his involvement during the Grable test. Then serving in the U.S. Army, he recalled being situated in trenches near ground zero as the artillery shell flew directly overhead. The men rose from their trenches after the detonation and were soon engulfed in dust stirred up from the blast wave. Emerging from the trenches, they proceeded to march towards ground zero as a part of a military exercise. Later, he saved some of the dust on his uniform and placed it in a can. At Sandia years later he had it tested, and the dust still registered as mildly radioactive.

(Source for story: Schlosser, Eric "Command and Control" 326-327. Penguin Press. New York. 2013)(Notes: nuclearweaponarchive.org, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Fact Sheet - Operation Upshot-Knothole)(Photos: National Nuclear Security Administration)

Ronald Reagan Minuteman Missile State Historic Site

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